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Adams: Recent Developments in Oklahoma Law--Civil Procedure

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OKLAHOMA
LAW-CIVIL PROCEDURE
Charles W. Adams*

I.

INTRODUrlON

This article examines a number of developments in the
Oklahoma law of civil procedure during the past year. None of these
developments were revolutionary, but they involved a wide spectrum
of procedural topics ranging from territorial jurisdiction and pleading
to remedies and appellate procedure.
The sources of these recent developments were varied as well.
They were brought about through: 1) amendments to the Oklahoma
Statutes, 2) revisions of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure'
and the Oklahoma Rules for District Courts,2 and 3) new decisions by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Appeals.
The major statutory changes are found in Senate Bill 1076. 3 These
include 1) incorporation of the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 11 into the Oklahoma Pleading Code,4 2) new
requirements for confidentiality orders involving discovery, 5 3) a provision that deposition transcripts are no longer to be filed with the
court unless the court orders otherwise or they are needed for trial,6
and 4) a series of7 amendments making prematurely filed post-trial
motions effective.
The revisions of the Oklahoma Rules of Appellate Procedure and
the Oklahoma Rules for District Courts were made to establish an
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law, Chair, Civil Procedure Committee, Oklahoma Bar Association, 1994-95.
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2 (1991).

2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app. (1991).
3. 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 343.
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (Supp. 1994).

5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3226(C)(2) (Supp. 1994).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3230(G) (Supp. 1994).

7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 653(c), 698, 1031.1 (Supp. 1994).
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innovative procedure for accelerated appellate review of summary
judgments and orders dismissing cases for failure to state a claim or
lack of jurisdiction.
The new case law involves a variety of topics. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court decided significant cases involving territorial jurisdiction' and the amendment of pleadings9 under the Oklahoma Pleading
Code. Three separate panels of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
ruled that Oklahoma's savings statute did not extend the time for filing suit against a municipality under the Governmental Tort Claims
Act.10 During the past year, an especially large number of cases dealt
with attorney fees issues." Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
handed down several opinions on whether signed minute orders constituted judgments under the most recent Judgments Act which went
into effect in 1993.1
The statutory amendments, revisions to the court rules, and the
recent appellate decisions are reviewed below. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court decisions on territorial jurisdiction and procedural
due process are discussed in Part II. Several cases involving statutes
of limitations are analyzed in Part III. Part IV is concerned with the
recent amendments to the Oklahoma Discovery Code concerning
confidentiality orders and the filing of deposition transcripts. Part V
covers the amendments to title 12, section 2011 of the Oklahoma Statutes, an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision on amendment of pleadings, the accelerated appellate review procedure for summary
judgments, and a case on judicial disqualification. Part VI discusses
the recent cases dealing with attorney fees. The statutory amendments affecting appellate procedure are examined in Part VII along
with several recent cases.

8. Hough v. Leonard, 867 P.2d 438, 440 (Okla. 1993).
9. Prough v. Edinger, Inc., 862 P.2d 71, 73 (Okla. 1993).
10. Gibson v. City of Tulsa, 88Q P.2d 429 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Robbins v. City of Del City,
875 P.2d 1170 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Ceasar v. City of Tulsa, 861 P.2d 349 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
11. See Rout v. Crescent Pub. Works Auth., 878 P.2d 1045 (Okla. 1994); Taylor v. Chubb
Group of Ins. Cos., 874 P.2d 806 (Okla. 1994); Smith v. Jenkins, 873 P.2d 1044 (Okla. 1994);
Trner Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Stapleton, 872 P.2d 926 (Okla. 1994); Oklahoma "hmrpike
Auth. v. New Life Pentecostal Church, 870 P.2d 762 (Okla. 1994); Gorst v. Wagner, 865 P.2d
1227 (Okla. 1993); Oklahoma Tulrnpike Auth. v. New, 853 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1993); Wright v. Arnold, 877 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
12. Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing, Inc., 879 P.2d 132 (Okla. 1994); Aven v. Reeh, 878
P.2d 1069,1070 (Okla. 1994); Mansell v. City of Lawton, 877 P.2d 1120 (Okla. 1994); Manning v.
State ex reL Dep't of Pub. Safety, 876 P.2d 667, 668 (Okla. 1994).
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II.

JURISDICrION AND DUE PROCESS

In 1984 the Oklahoma Pleading Code replaced Oklahoma's two
prior long arm statutes' 3 with the following brief but comprehensive
provision: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of
the United States.'

4

This provision was construed by the Oklahoma

Supreme Court for the first time in Hough v. Leonard."
Hough arose out of a contract employing an Oklahoma oil field
service company to remove an obstruction from an oil well which was
owned and operated by the defendants and located just across the
Oklahoma-Kansas border in Kansas. 6 The contract was formed after
a number of attempts by Kansas firms to unplug the well had failed.' 7
One of the defendants, acting as the agent for the others, telephoned
the plaintiff from Texas and asked him for a quotation of his rates to
provide additional services.' The plaintiff faxed the quotation to the
defendant. 19 A few days later the defendants' agent telephoned the
plaintiff again and they entered into the contract over the telephone.'
After a dispute arose over the terms of the contract, the plaintiff left
the job and the defendants contacted other Oklahoma companies to
provide services on the well.2 ' The plaintiff then brought suit in
Oklahoma to recover payment for his services.22 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over the defendants based on the
"totality of [their] contacts" with Oklahoma. 3 These consisted of
their agent's entering into the contract over the telephone in
Oklahoma, their contacting the other Oklahoma companies for services on the well, and one of the defendants' ownership of leasehold
interests in Oklahoma.24 The court observed that while each of these
contacts standing alone might not suffice to subject the defendants to
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 187(a), 1701.03 (1981) (repealed 1984).
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (1991).

15.
16.
17.
18.

867 P.2d 438, 442 (Okla. 1993).
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.

19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 444.

24. Id.
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jurisdiction in Oklahoma, they were sufficient as a whole for the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants by an Oklahoma
coulrt.25

The court stated that Oklahoma's current long arm statute 26 was
a codification of its prior holding in Fields v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc.27 The intent of the Oklahoma long-arm statute was to extend the
jurisdiction of Oklahoma courts to the outer limits permitted by the
United States and Oklahoma Constitutions.' Citing a number of decisions by the United States Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court noted that a non-resident can be subject to jurisdiction in
Oklahoma even if he never enters the state, if he engages in activity
outside of Oklahoma that results in harm in the state.29 Thus, neither
the fact that the defendants were not physically present in Oklahoma
nor that the contract was not performed in Oklahoma prevented the
Oklahoma courts from asserting jurisdiction.
Another recent case decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court
was concerned with the fourteenth amendment's requirement of procedural due process.3" In a line of decisions beginning with Bomford
v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,31 the Oklahoma Supreme Court has struck
down various procedures on due process grounds because they did not
afford persons who were being deprived of property by state action
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. Consistent with
this line of decisions, in Hagar v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,32 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidated, on due process grounds, a portion of Rule 10 of the Rules for District Courts.3 The first paragraph
of Rule 10 requires the giving of five days notice before the taking of a
default judgment, but the second paragraph has a long list of exceptions to the notice requirement, including cases where the defaulting
party has not made an appearance and garnishment proceedings. 34
The Hagar case involved a garnishment proceeding against the defendant's employer.35 After answering three garnishment summons,
the employer failed to answer three later ones that were served
25. Id.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (1991).
555 P.2d 48, 52 (OkIa. 1976).
Hough, 867 P.2d at 442.
Id.
Hagar v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1993).
440 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1968).
853 P.2d 768, 770 (OkIa. 1993).
Id. at 769.
OK". STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., R. 10 (1991).

35. Hagar,853 P.2d at 768-69.
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shortly before the defendant ified for bankruptcy.36 The trial court
entered a default judgment against the garnishee without prior notice
having been given to it, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed by
holding that while Rule 10 did not require the giving of notice, due
process did.37 The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the employer's name and address were readily available to the plaintiff, since
it had previously answered three garnishment summons, and therefore, the plaintiff should have sent notice to the employer before taking the default judgment? The Hagar decision casts doubt on the
validity of the remaining exceptions to notice in the second paragraph
of Rule 10. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has upheld the
taking of a default judgment without notice against a party who has
not made an appearance, 39 the other exceptions from the notice requirement, such as those for small claims, forcible entry, juvenile, and
probate proceedings, appear questionable in light of Hagar.
In addition to territorial jurisdiction and procedural due process,
another issue that may be encountered at the beginning of a lawsuit is
the statute of limitations defense. This is the subject of the next part
of this article.
III.

STATUTEs OF LIMITATION

The Oklahoma Supreme Court and Oklahoma Court of Appeals
addressed several statute of limitations issues during 1994. In Ball v.

Harnischfeger Corp., the Oklahoma Supreme Court examined the
statute of repose 4 ' for improvements to real property.42 The Court of
Appeals considered whether Oklahoma's savings statute43 applied to
suits under the Governmental Tort Claims Act." Lastly, the Court of
Appeals ruled in Griderv. IndependentSchool District5 that once the
180 day period for filing an action under the Government Tort Claims
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Ia at 769.
Id
Id at 770.
See Bovasso v. Sample, 649 P.2d 521, 523 (Okla. 1982).
877 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1994).

41. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 109 (1991).

42. Id
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).
44. Gibson v. City of Tlsa, 880 P.2d 429,430 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Robbins v. City of Del
City, 875 P.2d 1170,1171 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Ceasar v. City of 'Thsa, 861 P.2d 349,350 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1993).
45. 872 P.2d 951 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
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Act had expired, it could not be revived by filing a new claim with the
political subdivision.'
Responding to a question certified by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decided in Ball that under certain circumstances the statute of
repose for improvements to real property47 could apply to the manufacturer of a product that became an improvement to real property
after being installed on the property.48 The Ball case arose out of an
49
employee's fall from an overhead crane at the Port of Muskogee.
The plaintiff ified a products liability action against the crane's manufacturer more than ten years after the crane had been manufactured
and installed at the port terminal.50 The defendant asserted that the
action was barred by the statute of repose in title 12, section 109 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, which limits the time to bring an action arising
out of any deficiency in the construction of an improvement to real
property to ten years from the substantial completion of the improvement.5 ' The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that section 109
would not be applicable to the manufacturer of a mass produced product (such as plywood) that is incorporated into an improvement, because the statute is limited to actions against persons involved in the
design, planning, or supervision of the construction of improvements.5 2 It held, however, that section 109 did apply to the defendant
in the Ball case, because the defendant had specially designed the
crane to the specifications of the owner of the port terminal and had
provided a representative to observe the crane's installation.53
During the past year, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals decided
four cases involving the relationship of statutes of limitations to the
Governmental Tort Claims Act.54 In three of the cases, three separate
55
panels of the Court of Appeals held that Oklahoma's savings statute
was not applicable to suits under the Governmental Tort Claims
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 952.
OKt.L. STAT. tit. 12, § 109 (1991).
Ball, 877 P.2d at 50.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.

51.

ld.

52. Id. at 50.
53. Id.
54. Ceasar v. City of ThIsa, 861 P.2d 349 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993); Gibson v. City of Tlsa, 880
P.2d 429 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Robbins v. City of Del City, 875 P.2d 1170 (Okla. Ct. App.
1994); Grider v. Independent Sch. Dist., 872 P.2d 951 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).
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Act.56 The justification for all three decisions was the same: that the
Act's special 180 day time limitation for filing an action was a condition precedent to the bringing of an action, rather than an affirmative
defense of limitations." In the first case, Ceasarv. City of Tulsa5 8 the
plaintiff presented a timely claim to the City of Tulsa and before the
denial of the claim, fied a premature action against the City. 9 After
the claim was deemed denied, the plaintiff amended his petition to
allege denial of the claim, instead of filing a new action.6" The trial
court dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with the Governmental Tort Claims Act.61 In
addition, the trial court refused to apply the savings statute 62 which
provides that if an action is timely commenced and fails otherwise
than upon its merits, the action may be refiled within one year of the
dismissal of the first action.63 The Court of Appeals decided that the
trial court was correct in refusing to apply the savings statute. a It
reasoned:
Section 100 is a remedial statute which operates generally to extend
the statute of limitations in that it serves strictly to lengthen the
period allowed for the commencement of an action or proceeding.
In contrast, the special time limitations of the [Governmental Tort
Claims] Act are conditions imposed upon the very right to bring the
action and are not directed solely to the remedy.65
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the filing of
the amended petition obviated any error in the premature filing of the
original petition.66
Ceasarwas followed in Gibson v. City of Tulsa67 and Robbins v.
City of Del City,68 which both held section 100 inapplicable to claims
under the Governmental Tort Claims Act.69
56. Ceasar, 861 P.2d at 349; Gibson, 880 P.2d at 429; Robbins, 875 P.2d at 1170.
57. Ceasar, 861 P.2d at 349; Gibson, 880 P.2d at 429; Robbins, 875 P.2d at 1170.

58.
59.
60.
61.

861 P.2d 349 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 350.
ld.
1&

62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).

63. Ceasar,861 P.2d at 350.
64. Id. at 350-51.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 351.
880 P.2d 429 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
875 P.2d 1170 (OkIa. Ct. App. 1994).
Gibson, 880 P.2 at 430; Robbins, 875 P.2d at 1170.
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The Oklahoma Court of Appeals rejected a creative attempt to
avoid the Governmental Tort Claims Act's 180 day limit in Grider.7 °
Title 51, section 157(B) provides that an action under the Governmental Tort Claims Act must be filed within 180 days from the denial of
the plaintiff's claim, which itself must be fied within one year of the
date of the loss under section 156(B). 71 After the 180 day period expired, the plaintiff filed a second notice within one year of the loss,
and then filed a petition within 180 days after the second notice was
deemed denied.7 2 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that there
was no statutory basis for allowing a second notice to revive a barred
claim. 73
There were also developments during the past year with respect
to civil discovery. Most of the developments relating to discovery
were statutory, but the most significant development was the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Tuller v. Shallcross.74 These
developments are examined below.
IV.

DISCOVERY

In Tuller, the Oklahoma Supreme Court authorized discovery of
automobile liability insurance information under the Oklahoma Discovery Code. 75 Before the Oklahoma Discovery Code was adopted in
1982, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had held in two cases that liability insurance information was not discoverable because it did not bear
on the merits of the case and it was not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.76 The Oklahoma Discovery Code, as it
was introduced in the Oklahoma Legislature, contained a provision
for the discoverability of liability insurance that was identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2). This provision was stricken in
the Oklahoma House of Representatives, however, and the version
that was finally enacted contained no provision for discovery of liability insurance.7 7 In 1994, the Oklahoma Bar Association sponsored a
Legislative Program to restore the stricken provision to the Oklahoma
Discovery Code, and although the Bar's Bill passed the Oklahoma
70. Grider v. Independent Sch. Dist., 872 P.2d 951 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 157(B) (1991 & Supp. 1994).

72. Grider, 872 P.2d at 952.
73. Id.
74. 886 P.2d 481 (Okla. 1994).
75. Id. at 485.
76. Hall v. Paul, 549 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1976); Carman v. Fshel, 418 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1966).
77. Michael Minnis, House Bill 1912: The New Oklahoma Discovery Code, 53 OKLA. B.J.
1291 (1982).
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Legislature, it was vetoed by Governor Walters. 78 Despite the absence of an express statutory provision for discovery of liability insurance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found support for overruling its
precedent in the Legislature's enactment of the Compulsory Liability
79
Insurance Law in 1983.80
The Tuller case arose out of a personal injury action in which the
plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier had intervened on the ground
that it could be liable for the amount of a verdict that exceeded the
defendant's liability insurance coverage. 81 After the trial court denied
the plaintiff's motion to compel disclosure of the defendant's liability
insurance, the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to require the defendant to produce information concerning his automobile liability insurance.' Noting that the Compulsory Liability Insurance Law
mandates automobile liability insurance coverage, the court decided
that requiring disclosure of the underlying policy did not violate the
insured's right of privacy. 3 The court also observed that "[d]enying
discovery [of liability insurance] introduces an undesirable element of
hide and seek into the process."' On the other hand, allowing discovery would provide the "information necessary to produce results [that
are] fair to both sides" and also would minimize the possibility of bad
faith litigation against uninsured motorist carriers.85 Accordingly, it
granted the writ of mandamus and
directed the trial court to order
86
discovery of the insurance policy.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly limited its holding, however, to automobile liability insurance policies covered by the Compulsory Liability Insurance Law, leaving open the question of whether
its holding will be extended to other types of liability insurance.87 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and the other jurisdictions8 9 which
78. Tuller, 886 P.2d at 484; Sidney G. Dunagan, Governor Vetoes Amendments to Pleading
and Discovery Codes, 65 OKu.A. BJ. 1453 (Apr. 30, 1994); Marvin C. Emerson, Legislative Report, 65 OKLA. BJ. 1411 (Apr. 23, 1994).
79. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 7-600 to 7-610 (1991).
80. Tuller, 886 P.2d at 483.
81. Id. at 482.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 483-84.
84. Id. at 484.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 485.
87. Id. at 484.
88. FED. P.CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(D) (mandatory initial disclosure of insurance agreements).
89. See, e-g., CaL. Cmy. PRoc. CODE § 2017(b) (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 3101(0 (McKinney 1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. 4003.2 (1987); Tax. R. Civ. P.
ANN'. 166b(2)(t) (West 1994).
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authorize discovery of insurance do not distinguish between automobile and other liability insurance policies. However, these other jurisdictions did not base their decision to allow discovery on the presence
of a Compulsory Liability Insurance Law and so it is conceivable that
the Oklahoma Supreme Court would not allow discovery of other liability insurance.
The major statutory developments concerning discovery were the
amendments to the Oklahoma Discovery Code in Senate Bill 1076.90
The first change was the addition of the following language to title 12,
section 3226 of the Oklahoma Statutes which governs protective
orders:
Any protective order of the court which has the effect of removing
any material obtained by discovery from the public record shall contain the following:
a. a statement that the court has determined it is necessary in
the interests of justice to remove the material from the public
record,
b. specific identification of the material which is to be removed or withdrawn from the public record, or which is to be
filed but not placed in the public record, and
c. a requirement that any party obtaining a protective order
place the protected material in a sealed manila envelope clearly
marked with the caption and case number and is clearly
marked with the word "CONFIDENTIAL", and stating the
date the order
was entered and the name of the judge entering
91
the order.

Confidentiality orders have generated significant controversy in
recent years, particularly because of their widespread use in products
liability cases that are settled. Critics have complained that the insistence by product manufacturers on agreements to confidentiality orders as a condition of settlement has hampered the dissemination of
information concerning dangerous products and interfered with the
prosecution of cases by other injured plaintiffs. 2 This has led several
states to enact legislation to limit the use of confidentiality orders. 93
It does not appear that the Oklahoma amendment quoted above
will have a significant effect on the use of confidentiality orders. The
first requirement, necessity for removing the discovery material from
90. 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 343.
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3226(C)(2) (Supp. 1994).
92. See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U.
hIL. L. REv. 457, 463-64.
93. Id. at 464-65; Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to
the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 428, 429-30 n.7 (1991).
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the public record, is duplicative of the requirement of "good cause,"
which has long been a prerequisite for the issuance of protective orders. The second requirement, identifying the materials that are being
removed from the public record, would not curtail the use of confidentiality orders directly. However, it may facilitate a challenge to a
confidentiality order in a case where the identification of the confidential materials shows that the order was improperly granted. The
third requirement merely provides a procedure for the sealing of the
materials. Thus, the amendment is more superficial than of practical
importance.
At the same time that the Oklahoma Legislature added new requirements for confidentiality orders in section 3226, it removed depositions from the public record by the addition of the following
language to title 12, section 3230: "Except on order of the court or
unless a deposition is attached to a motion response [sic] thereto, or is
needed for use in a trial or hearing, depositions shall not be filed with
the court clerk." 94 Although depositions will no longer be filed with
the court clerk as a general matter, they may be subject to disclosure
by the parties unless their confidentiality is protected by a court order.
Another statutory change relating to discovery corrects a loophole that was created when title 12, section 2004.1 was amended 95 to
provide for the issuance of a subpoena for a deposition by the court
clerk of the court where the action is pending, rather than by the court
clerk of the district where the deposition is to be taken. If the court
where the action was pending were in another state, a litigant would
have to seek a court order to obtain a subpoena for the taking of a
deposition in Oklahoma.96 To keep the court from becoming involved
in such matters, section 2004.1 was amended to provide that for actions pending in other states, the clerk of the court where a deposition
is to be taken has authority to issue a subpoena for the deposition.97
The only significant new case pertaining to discovery, besides the
Tuller decision is Higginbothamv. Jackson.98 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court assumed original jurisdiction and issued a writ of prohibition
against enforcement of a trial court's order requiring a plaintiff in a
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3230(G)(1) (Supp. 1994).

1993 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 1.
Oa.A. STAT. it12, § 1703.02 (1991).
OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 2004.1 (Supp. 1994).
869 P.2d 319 (Okla. 1994).
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personal injury case to execute a general medical authorization entitling the defendant to obtain all of the plaintiff's medical records. 99 It
held that no provision of the Oklahoma Discovery Code requires a
plaintiff in a personal injury case to execute such an order and that
title 76, section 19(B), which provides for a blanket waiver of the phy"
sician-patient privilege, applies only to medical malpractice cases.1 00
There were a variety of recent developments relating to pleading,
summary judgment, and trial. The statute governing sanctions was extensively revised, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided cases involving amendment of pleadings and the standard for disqualification of
judges, and it set up a new procedure for appellate review of summary
judgments and orders dismissing actions for failure to state a claim. A
discussion of these developments follows.
V.

PLEADING, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TRIAL

Senate Bill 1076101 included a complete rewriting of title 12, section 2011102 of the Oklahoma Statutes to incorporate the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11, from which section
2011 was taken. Because of the harshness of its provisions for sanctions, Rule 11 had generated great controversy in the federal courts.
The 1993 amendments were made to reduce the severity of the threat
of sanctions in litigation and also to correct some interpretation
problems that had developed under the Federal Rule. 0 3 Probably the
most significant change made to both Rule 11 and Section 2011 is the
"safe harbor" provision which provides that a party will not be subject
to sanctions unless it refuses to withdraw or correct its challenged paper or contention within 21 days of service of a motion seeking sanctions.1°4 In addition, a party is now allowed to make allegations or
factual contentions without evidentiary support as long as they are
specifically identified and the party certifies that evidentiary support is
likely to follow after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. 0 5 The
amendments also limit the amount of sanctions to what is necessary
for deterrence of a further violation, rather than for compensation of
99. Id
100. Id
101. 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 343.
102. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011 (Supp. 1994).

103. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
104. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011(C)(1)(a) (Supp. 1994).
105. Id § 2011(B)(3).
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the moving party.1°6 Moreover, because their purpose is deterrence,
not compensation, sanctions should ordinarily be paid to the court,
rather than awarded to the moving party.1°7 Although section 2011
has not generated the problems in Oklahoma state courts that Rule 11
has in the federal courts, the amendments to section 2011 are beneficial because they clarify a number of issues relating to sanctions.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a helpful opinion concerning the amendment of pleadings in Prough v. Edinger, Inc. 0 8 After
filing its answer, the defendant in Prough learned for the first time
through discovery that most of the plaintiffs' damages were barred by
the statute of limitations, and it requested leave to amend the answer
to raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.10 9 The
trial court denied the request, 110 and on certified interlocutory appeal,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the denial of
leave to amend was an abuse of discretion."' Noting that title 12,
section 2015(A) provides that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given
when justice so requires,""' 2 the court decided that it was an abuse of
discretion for a trial court to deny leave to amend in the absence of
undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to correct deficiencies by
prior amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility
of the requested amendment." 3 In doing so, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court adopted the standards set out by the United States Supreme
Court in Foman v. Davis," 4 which involved an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15.
Through its amendment of Rules 4 and 13 of the Rules for District Courts," 5 and Rule 1.203 of the Rules for Appellate Procedure in
Civil Cases," 6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court created a new procedure
for accelerated appellate review of summary judgments and orders
dismissing cases based on a failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. The most noteworthy feature of this procedure for accelerated
appellate review is that no appellate briefs are permitted, unless the
106. I § 2011(C)(2).
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes (1993).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

862 P.2d 71 (Okla. 1993).
Id.at 73.
Id.
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 73-74 (quoting OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, § 2015 (A)(1991)).
Id. at 77.
371 U.s 178, 182 (1962).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., R. 4, 13 (Supp. 1994).
OKLA.STAr. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2, R. 1.203 (Supp. 1994).
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appellate court orders otherwise. 117 In addition, the record on appeal
is limited to: 1) the summary judgment or order of dismissal, 2) the
pleadings, 3) the motion and response below along with supporting
materials, including briefs, 4) transcripts of the hearing on the motion,
if any, 5) any other order dismissing some but not all parties or claims,
6) any motions for reconsideration of the summary judgment or order
of dismissal, and 7) any other material on file that the trial court considered in reaching its decision." 8 Thus, the appellate court's review
is restricted to those materials that were available to the trial court in
making its decision. Because motions for reconsideration that were
filed in the trial court will be available to the appellate court, 19 a
party who is surprised by a trial court's granting a summary judgment
or motion to dismiss may supplement the record available to the appellate court by filing a motion for reconsideration. However, a party
will generally not be allowed to bring any materials before the appel120
late court that the trial court was not able to consider.
It is likely that the elimination of the briefing cycle and the simplification of the record on appeal will significantly expedite the appellate review of summary judgments and orders of dismissal.
Reducing delay in the review process is especially desirable for cases
where the appellate court reverses the trial court's decision because it
lessens the interruption that the appeal caused in the movement of the
case to trial.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the standards for disqualification of a trial judge in Holloway v. Hopper.'' The Holloway
case arose out of a divorce action in which the wife sought the judge's
disqualification by following the procedure in Rule 15 of the Rules for
District Courts." The trial judge was married to an attorney with
whom the husband in the divorce action had consulted concerning the
property settlement in the case.'2 3 There was no basis for disqualification under the governing statute' 24 because neither the trial judge's
117. Id. R. 1.203(A)(3).
118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., R. 4(m), 13(h); ch. 15, app. 2, R. 1.203(A)(1) (Supp.

1994).
119. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., R. 4(m)(9), 13(h)(7);

ch. 15, app. 2, R.

1.203(A)(1)(a)(7), (b)(9) (Supp. 1994).
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2, R. 1.203(A)(3) (Supp. 1994) (briefs are not allowed
unless the appellate court orders otherwise).
121. 852 P.2d 711 (Okla. 1993).
122. Id. at 712.
123. Id. at 712.
124. OKLA. STAT. tit 20, § 1401 (1991).
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wife nor her firm entered an appearance.125 Nevertheless, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that disqualification was required
under Canon 3(C)(1)(d)(ii) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 126 which
states that a judge should be disqualified or disqualify himself in a
proceeding where his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where the judge's spouse is acting as a lawyer in the
proceeding. 27 Although there was no evidence that the trial judge
had discussed the case with his wife, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
issued a writ of mandamus ordering that disqualification was appropriate because of the appearance of impropriety.'2
The next section of this article deals with attorney fees, an area
where the Oklahoma Supreme Court has been especially active
recently.
VI.

ATrORNEY FEES

During the last year, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals resolved a number of issues pertaining to attorney fees.
These included the enforceability of nonrefundable retainer provisions, whether time charges for legal assistants may be awarded as
attorney fees, whether both sides are entitled to an award of attorney
fees if they each prevail on their claims and counterclaims, whether
attorney fees may be awarded in slander of title cases and in actions
under the Governmental Tort Claims Act, the amount of attorney fees
that a court may award if a personal injury action is brought in bad
faith, and the types of expenses that may be recovered by a prevailing
landowner in condemnation actions.
In Wright v. Arnold, 29 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals ruled
that a nonrefundable retainer provision in an attorney-client contract
was unenforceable, because it was an impermissible restraint on a client's right to discharge an attorney and it violated Rule 1.16 of the
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. 30 Upon termination of the
attorney-client relationship, an attorney is entitled only to the reason131
able value of the services rendered to the date of termination.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
OLA. STAT. fit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4, 3(c)(1)(d)(ii) (1991).
Holloway, 852 P.2d at 713.
Id.
877 P.2d 616 (OkIa. Ct. App. 1994).
i. at 618.
1d. at 619.
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Following precedent from the United States Supreme Court, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Taylor v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies,132 that hourly charges for legal assistants may be included in an award of attorney fees under the Oklahoma Statutes.133
The Oklahoma Supreme Court limited its holding to the circumstances where the legal assistants' time is customarily billed to clients
and the legal assistants' services involved substantive legal work that
would otherwise have to be performed by an attorney at a higher
hourly rate.134 Thus, time spent by a paralegal copying documents or
doing other secretarial tasks could not be included in an attorney fees
award. 35 The Taylor decision encourages the use of legal assistants,
and thus it should have the salutary effect of lowering costs for legal
services.
In Smith v. Jenkins, 36 the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided
that both sides may recover attorney fees if they each prevail on their
respective claim and counterclaim. 137 In Smith, the plaintiff sued for
property damage arising out of an automobile accident and the defendant also filed a counterclaim for property damage. 38 In a bench
trial, the court found both sides equally at fault and awarded damages
to each under the comparative negligence statute for 50% of the respective amounts of their property damage. 1 39 Both parties sought attorney fees pursuant to title 12, section 940(A), but the trial court
determined that there could be only one prevailing party in a case,
and therefore awarded attorney fees only to the defendant, who had
recovered the greater amount for her property damage.140 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the award of attorney fees to only one prevailing party was inconsistent with
Oklahoma's comparative negligence scheme.' 41 Its decision was expressly limited to comparative negligence cases in which claims and
compulsory counterclaims are asserted for the same tort. 42
132. 874 P.2d 806 (Okla. 1994).
133. Id at 807.
134. Id. at 809.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id
873 P.2d 1044 (OkIa. 1994).
Id at 1045.
Id

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id
Id
Id. at 1049.
Id.
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Turner Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Stapleton,143 dealt with the
scope of section 940, which authorizes an award of attorney fees for
negligent or willful injury to property.'" Following its earlier decision
in Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp.,145 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that Section 940 applied only
to physical injuries to property and not to damages to property rights,
such as slander of title or conversion, that did not result in physical
injury to the property itself. 146 The Oklahoma Supreme Court expressly overruled the contrary decision of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in McDowell v. Glasscock.147

Rout v. Crescent Public Works Authority,"4 dealt with the relationship between section 940 and the Governmental Tort Claims
Act.' 49 After prevailing in an action for property damage against a
political subdivision, the plaintiff was awarded attorney fees by the
trial court.' 50 The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed.' 5 ' It pointed
out that while the Governmental Tort Claims Act does not expressly
authorize an award of attorney fees against a political subdivision, section 164 of the Act incorporates the Oklahoma Statutes that are not
inconsistent with the Act.'52 Accordingly, it held that attorney fees
may be recovered against a political subdivision if the recovery was
otherwise authorized by statute. 3
The Oklahoma Supreme Court applied title 23, section 103 to
limit an award of attorney fees in Gorst v. Wagner 5 4 After sustaining
a demurrer to the evidence in an action for civil conspiracy, the trial
court found that the action was not well grounded in fact, was brought
in bad faith, and was vexatious, and it awarded an assessment in excess of $35,000 in attorney fees and costs against the plaintiff.155 The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that section 103 limited an award of
costs, including attorney fees, based on a finding of bad faith to
$10,000.156
143. 872 P.2d 926 (OkIa. 1994).

144. Id at 927.
145. 700 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Okla. 1985).

146. Turner Roofing, 872 P.2d at 928.
147. 672 P.2d 682 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

878 P.2d 1045 (Okla. 1994).
OKLA. STAT. fit. 51, §§ 151-172 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
Rout, 878 P.2d at 1047.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1051.
865 P.2d 1227 (Okla. 1993).
Id. at 1228.
Id
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the award of attorney
fees and expenses in condemnation actions in two recent cases.1 57 In
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. New,158 the court disallowed recovery of litigation expenses for copying, mileage, long distance telephone calls, telefax expenses, and postage for the reason that they
were part of the attorney's overhead.-1 9 This ruling can be expected
to affect the billing practices of attorneys who handle condemnation
cases. Instead of billing clients for these charges separately, condemnation attorneys should incorporate the charges into their hourly billing rates as part of their overhead. In Oklahoma Turnpike Authority
v. New Life PentecostalChurch, 60 the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld an attorney fee award based on a 40% contingency contract.1 6 1 It
ruled that attorney fees may be awarded on a contingency fee basis as
long as the fees are not excessive. 162
Appellate procedure is another area where there were a number
of significant developments in the past year. These consisted of a
number of statutory amendments involving the effectiveness of posttrial motions as well as a series of decisions clarifying what constitutes
a "judgment" under the recently adopted Judgments and Appeals
Act. The next section considers these developments.
VII.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Senate Bill 1076163 contained a series of amendments to title 12,
sections 653, 698, and 1031.1 that make effective, prematurely filed
motions for new trial, motions for judgment n.o.v., and motions to
modify or vacate a judgment. The Judgments Act provided that any
of these motions was to be fied within ten days after the filing of the
judgment. This created the possibility that one of these motions could
be premature, and hence ineffective, because it was filed before the
judgment was filed. 164 The premature filing of a post-trial motion
157. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. New, 853 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1993); Oklahoma Turnpike
Auth. v. New Life Pentecostal Church, 870 P.2d 762 (Okla. 1994).
158. 853 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1993).
159. Id. at 767.
160. 870 P.2d 762 (Okla. 1994).
161. Id at 769.
162. Id. at 766.
163. 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 343.
164. Cf Brown v. Green Country Softball Ass'n, 884 P.2d 851, 853 (Okla. 1994) (motion for
new trial was premature, but decision operated only prospectively after issuance of mandate in
case).
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would not cause any prejudice to the opposing party, who would receive fair notice of the relief that the moving party was seeking. By
making prematurely filed motions effective as long as they are filed
after the pronouncement of the judgment, the amendments to sections
653, 698, and 1031 have removed a procedural trap that could otherwise prevent the motions from being decided on their merits.
In the past year, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has issued a
number of opinions dealing with the revisions to appellate procedure
made by the Judgments Act that went into effect on October 1, 1993.
The major difficulties concerned the appealability of minute orders,
but the Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to have resolved most of
these problems in a series of decisions holding that minute orders are
not appealable. 165 There were also two decisions concerning the timing of appeals in cases where less than all claims are decided. 6 6 Lastly,
one case addressed the liberal standard for sufficiency of a petition in
error to preserve allegations of error for appellate review.167
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided four cases involving the
appealability of minute orders in June and July of 1994. The first case,
Manning v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety,' 6 s was decided
under the law prior to October 1, 1993, the effective date of the Judgments Act. It involved a handwritten entry on a printed form labelled
"court minute," which was made and signed by the trial judge and set
forth all the terms of his ruling. 6 9 Before the parties left the courtroom, the judge directed the plaintiff's counsel to prepare a journal
entry, and the journal entry containing the same terms as the court's
early handwritten entry was filed several weeks later. 70 The defendant's petition in error was filed less than thirty days after the filing of
the journal entry but more than thirty days after the filing of the handwritten entry.' 7 ' The court held that the petition in error was filed too
late, but gave its ruling only prospective effect because of the obscurity and complexity of the issue.'7 2 Justice Summers wrote a concurring opinion stating that his concurrence was based on the law in
165. Manning v. State ex reL Dep't of Pub. Safety, 876 P.2d 667 (Okla. 1994); Marshall v. OK
Rental & Leasing, Inc., 879 P.2d 132 (Okla. 1994); Mansell v. City of Lawton, 877 P.2d 1120
(Okla. 1994); Aven v. Reeh, 878 P.2d 1069 (Okla. 1994).
166. Jones v. TIbbs, 860 P.2d 234 (Okla. 1993); Davis v. Gray, 875 P.2d 1145 (Okla. 1994).
167. Markwell v. Whinery's Real Estate, Inc., 869 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1994).
168. 876 P.2d 667 (Okla. 1994).

169. Id. at 669.
170. Id.
171. Id.

172. Ii. at 673.
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effect prior to October 1, 1993, and he suggested that the result should
be different under the amendment to title 12, section 696.2(c), which
provides that a minute entry is not appealable. 173
Justice Summers wrote the majority opinions in the next three
cases involving minute orders. Marshall v. OK Rental & Leasing,
Inc.,174 was concerned with a minute order sheet filed before October
1, 1993, which contained orders in three cases, including an order
granting summary judgment against the plaintiff.175 At the top of the
minute order sheet was a statement signed by the trial judge directing
the court clerk to mail notice of the judge's rulings to the parties. 76
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the minute order sheet was
not appealable because the judge's signature did not appear below the
dispositive order granting summary judgment.17 7 Mansell v. City of
Lawton'78 and Aven v. Reeh 179 both involved minute orders that were
filed after October 1, 1993. In both cases, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that the orders were not appealable, even though they
were signed by a judge. 80
Jones v. Tubbs'81 concerned the finality of an order granting a
default judgment, where the trial court reserved ruling on punitive
damages, attorney fees, and costs.' s The Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the trial court's reservation of a decision on punitive damages prevented its ruling from being final, and hence appealable. 83
Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal.' 4 Davis v. Gray' 85 involved an
appeal from a default judgment against one out of thirty defendants. 8 ' Applying title 12, section 1006,11 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that a judgment by default against less than all parties to a
case was not appealable without an express direction by the trial judge
for the filing of judgment.18s
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 674.
879 P.2d 132 (Okla. 1994).
Id. at 133.
IdId. at 136-37.

178.
179.
180.
181.

877 P.2d 1120 (Okla. 1994).
878 P.2d 1069 (Okla. 1994).
Mansell, 877 P.2d at 1121; Aven, 878 P.2d at 1070.
860 P.2d 234 (OkIa. 1993).

182. Id.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 236.
875 P.2d 1145 (Okla. 1994).
Id. at 1146.
Renumbered to § 994 by 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 351, § 30.
Davis, 875 P.2d at 1147.
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In Markwell v. Whinery's Real Estate, Inc.,1 8 9 the Oklahoma

Supreme Court adopted what appears to be a "notice pleading" standard for the sufficiency of allegations of error in a petition in error.1 90
The sole mistake alleged in the petition in error in Markwell was that
the trial court should not have granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 191 While acknowledging that this was too general
of a statement to preserve the error under the applicable Rules of
Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases,"9 the nature of the allegations of
error was clarified in the summary of the case that was attached to the
petition in error and in the appellant's brief. 93 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court pointed out that the filing of a timely brief amends
deficiencies in a petition in error, and a formal amendment is not necessary if the issues briefed are fairly comprised within the allegations
of error.194 Concluding that the summary of the case and the brief
adequately informed it of the reasons why the appellant believed summary judgment was improper, the court ruled that the petition in error
was sufficient to preserve the allegations of error.195 In spite of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's leniency, the better practice would of
course be to state the allegations of error with some specificity in the
petition in error.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Oklahoma civil procedure continues to evolve, and there have
been recent developments in a variety of areas in the past year. Prob-

ably the most significant developments were the Tuller v. Shallcross
decision, 195 allowing discovery of liability insurance, and the new ac-

celerated appellate review procedure for summary judgments and orders of dismissal."
By giving plaintiffs access to the liability
insurance coverage of their adversaries, the Tuller decision promises
to facilitate early settlement, thereby reducing the number of cases
that have to be tried. The accelerated appellate review procedure can
be expected to substantially reduce the time for the disposition of appeals in important categories of cases. In addition, this innovative
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

869 P.2d 840, 842 (OkIa. 1994).
Id.at 844.
Id.at 842.
OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2, R. 1.16(C) (Para. D of Form) (1991).
Markwell, 869 P.2d at 842-43.
Id.at 843.
l at 844.
886 P.2d 481 (OkIa. 1994).
OKLA.STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., R. 4, 13; ch. 15, app. 2, RL 1.203 (Supp. 1994).
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procedure promises to improve the administration of justice by making sure that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts are
based on the same information. Both of these developments are
therefore not only significant, but are also likely to be beneficial to
litigants, lawyers, and judges.
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